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THE PERMISSIBILITY OF ROUTINE AIDS TESTING
IN THE HEALTH CARE CONTEXT
ZIYAD I. NACCASHA*
Doctors should be able to require testing for the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), AIDS-related complex (ARC),
or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) virus before
their patients undergo a non-emergency,' invasive procedure
or surgery: 2 a procedure where the risk of exposure to blood is
present. The test's result will give doctors the necessary infor-
mation about each patient in order to determine whether to
accept the patient or to refer him or her to other doctors. The
test's result will also apprise hospital staff of the potential risks
involved in treating a particular patient. Moreover, the result
will allow a patient to know whether he or she is infected, any
risks involved, and any treatments available. The purpose of
this student article is to demonstrate that health care providers
ought to be afforded the opportunity to test patients, so long as
they do so with a narrow purpose which has neither the intent
nor the effect of discriminating against the individual.
In the first part of this student article I provide a break-
down of the disease, a current statistical analysis, and an identi-
fication of the high risk groups. In the second part I analyze
the tests currently available in terms of cost, time factor, and
predictive value. I also analyze the historical treatment of
epidemics by doctors in conjunction with a study of ethical
codes of conduct. I then attempt to identify the policy and
rationale behind granting doctors discretion in requiring rou-
tine testing. Because the ultimate goal is to demonstrate the
need for routine testing, I analyze Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act to ascertain whether public hospitals are allowed, or
* B.S. 1987, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo;
J.D. 1990, University of Notre Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1988-90. I
would like to dedicate this student article to my parents, Ibrahim and Batoul
Naccasha.
1. Non-emergency because if treatment were conditioned on
submitting to a test in an emergency situation and the patient refuses or
cannot consent then that patient will be refused treatment where there is a
legally recognized duty on the part of the doctor to treat. See infra,
Emergency rule, notes 121 to 127 and accompanying text.
2. Invasive because these procedures present the greatest amount of
risk in terms of exposure to bodily fluids to doctors and their staff.
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should be allowed to require testing. Finally, I address confi-
dentiality concerns of those who test positively for the virus.
I. THE AIDS VIRUS
AIDS is a deadly and currently incurable disease. It afflicts
groups traditionally subjected to stigma and discrimination and
has the potential to afflict, exponentially, not only those groups
considered at risk, but a significant number of others, who are
not currently in the AIDS risk pool.
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) define AIDS as "a
disease, at least moderately predictive of a defect in cell-medi-
ated immunity, occurring in a person with no known cause for
diminished resistance for that disease." The illness manifests
itself in several forms. The forms currently recognized are a
chronic pneumonia called pneumocystis carinii pneumonia
(PCP),4 a rare cancer called Kaposi's Sarcoma (KS),5 opportu-
nistic infections,' and dementia.7 The several routes that the
3. Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) -United States, 31
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.
507-08 (1982). The case definition of AIDS was narrowed by a 1985 revision.
Id. vol. 34, at 373 (1985). Some argue that owing to this revision of.the case
definition of AIDS, the CDC's surveys are flawed because of the definition's
failure to encompass a number of persons having various forms of the disease
who would be otherwise reportable under the preceding definition. Leonard,
Employment Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 681,
688 n.32 (1985). The case definition was again revised in 1987. Revision of the
CDC Surveillance Case Definition for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 36
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. IS
(1987). This definition, which is currently followed, includes a broader
spectrum of diseases characteristically found in persons with HIV infection.
4. PCP is an infection of the lungs caused by the microorganism
pneumocystis carinii. The type of pneumonia the parasite causes is
pneumocystis pneumonia, an opportunistic infection that is dangerous only
to those with an impaired immunity system. Symptoms include fever, dry
cough, as well as shortness of breath. THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 803 (1989).
5. KS is a condition that is characterized by malignant skin tumors and
which is one of the prominent problems associated with AIDS. The tumors
spread throughout the person's skin, and may affect the gastrointestinal and
respiratory tracts. Id. at 614.
6. Opportunistic infections are caused by organisms that do not usually
cause disease in healthy people. There might also be widespread infection by
organisms that ordinarily produce only mild infection. While the organisms
which cause the various infections are generally present in the body, the
organisms only cause disease when the host's immune system is impaired. Id.
at 745-46.
7. Dementia is a general decline in all areas of mental ability which
usually results from brain disease, and which is progressive. A person with
dementia may have difficulty remembering recent events, may easily become
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disease may take are not mutually exclusive.8 What appear to
be common to infected individuals are the symptoms that man-
ifest themselves when the virus is first introduced into the
body.9 These symptoms include night sweats, chronic diar-
rhea, fevers, and weight loss, often associated with an enlarge-
ment of the lymph nodes (lymphadenopathy). l° Normally,
those infected are asymptomatic for a certain period during
which their immune systems slowly and then exponentially
deteriorate. I I
At the point of infection, for a variable amount of time, the
victims of the disease will be asymptomatic, and no outward
signs of infection will appear. At this time, the victim will not
test positive. Indeed, being exposed to the virus does not nec-
essarily mean infection, but it can, and it does, yearly, in
between one to five percent of those people infected with
HIV.' 2 After this incubation period, infected individuals may
suffer from an array of symptoms. Some develop KS, which
primarily afflicts homosexual men and is a leading complication
of the AIDS virus. Other victims develop PCP. Other infected
individuals will suffer from extreme opportunistic infections
that may include encephalitis i" and meningitis.' 4 And, still
others, over time, develop confusion and neurologic degenera-
tion or dementia.' 5
lost in what once was familiar, and may fail to grasp what is going on. Id. at
339.
8. Id. at 78-79. Infected individuals may have no symptom; others
experience short-lived, vague illnesses, and others proceed to full-blown
AIDS. These diseases may occur sequentially, or they can coexist.
9. M. SANDE & P. VOLBERDING, THE MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF AIDS 75,
76 (1988).
10. Id.
11. Sexually Transmitted Diseases Treatment Guidelines, 38 CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1 (Supp. S-8)
(1989).
12. THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE
76 (1989).
13. Encephalitis is an inflammation of the brain, usually caused by a
viral infection. The symptoms for this disease are capable of progressing to
the point where the person suffers from hallucinations, confusion, paralysis
of one side of the body, a coma, or epileptic seizures. Id. at 400-01.
14. Meningitis is an inflammation of the membranes that covers the
brain and spinal cord, that results from infection from a variety of
microorganisms. Id. at 675. For a list of the different types of opportunistic
infections see Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) - United
States, 31 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 507-08 (1982).
15. See supra, note 5.
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By whatever course the disease takes, those who progress
to the point of full-blown AIDS suffer from such a breakdown
in their immune systems that they will inevitably find them-
selves in a relentless downhill spiral, for which the consequence
can only be certain and painful death. 16
The disease progresses through a continuum of con-
ditions: (1) infection with HIV;' 7 (2) "acute, transient,
mononucleosis-like syndrome associated with seroconver-
sion;"' i (3) asymptomatic HIV infection;' 9 (4) symptomatic
HIV infection;20 and (5) full-blown AIDS.21
Since medical science identified the disease in 1981,22
AIDS has had a stinging effect on society. Sexually promiscu-
ous male homosexuals or bisexuals have been, and are, at
greatest risk and account for 63 percent of all AIDS cases. 23
The disease also afflicts intravenous drug users,24 recipients of
infected blood,25 heterosexuals who have intimate sexual con-
tact with infected bisexuals or with infected drug users,26
16. AIDS and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the U.S.: 1988
Update, 38 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 3 (Supp. S-4) (1989).
17. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE
1988 37 (1988).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Generally, this student article will use the terms "AIDS
carriers" or "infected individuals" to refer to persons at all stages who are
infected with and can transmit the virus.22. In June, 1981 the Centers for Disease Control reported a deadly
form of pneumonia, pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) in five
homosexuals in the Los Angeles area. Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.
250-51 (1981). Approximately a month later, ten more cases of PCP were
discovered in homosexual men in the New York area. Simultaneously, the
CDC reported an increasing number of homosexuals suffering from a rare
form of cancer, Kaposi's Sarcoma (KS). Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystis
Pneumonia Among Homosexual Men - New York City and California, 30 CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 305 (1981).
PCP and KS are the leading causes of death for infected individuals.
23. AIDS and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States:
1988 Update, 38 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDrrY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 7, 17 (Supp. S-4) (1989).
24. Id. Twenty percent of infected males and fifty-seven percent of
infected females have contracted AIDS as a result of intravenous drug abuse.
25. Id. Two percent of infected males and ten percent of infected
females have contracted AIDS by receiving infected blood.
26. Id. One percent of infected males and twenty-six percent of
infected females have contracted AIDS by having intimate sexual contact with
infected bisexuals or with infected intravenous drug abusers.
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hemophiliacs,2 7 and children born to infected mothers, who
account for two percent of the AIDS population.2" The
number and percentage of people not in these groups and who
are infected with AIDS is minuscule. 29
As of March 31, 1989, 89,501 cases of AIDS had been
reported to the CDC.3 ° The CDC estimated that, currently,
between 1 - 1.5 million people are HIV seropositive.3 ' 46,000
people have died thus far from the disease.3 2 By 1992, 365,000
are projected to have AIDS and 263,000 will have died from
AIDS-related causes.3 3
The disease is currently incurable, but the drug
Zidovudine (previously known as AZT), if administered early
(at the first sign of infection), inhibits the reproduction of the
AIDS virus in the body cells of persons suffering from PCP. 4
The Federal Drug Administration (FDA) has also approved
alpha interferon in November of 1988, s5 a drug specifically
developed for treating KS.3 6 Other drugs have also been
developed or are at the development stage which help victims
of AIDS deal with their symptoms, if the infected individual is
treated at the first sign of each new symptom. 3 7
Infected individuals may, at some point, consult a doctor
for an injury or illness related to the AIDS virus or for one
wholly unrelated to the virus. This doctor-patient juncture is
precisely where this student article's focus lies. Once the per-
27. Id. One percent of the AIDS population are hemophiliacs.
28. Id. at 2.
29. These statistics, as is the scope of this student article, are limited to
the United States.
30. Update: Heterosexual Transmission of AIDS and HIV Infection - United
States, 38 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 424 (1989).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. The actual number of deaths may be lower than estimated
depending on the success of new treatments for the virus.
34. While zidovudine does not cure the conditions an infected
individual suffers from, it can improve symptoms or prolong remission.
Zidovudine blocks the action of the enzyme which stimulates the AIDS virus
to grow and multiply. It improves the efficiency of the immune system,
making the occurrence of opportunistic infections less likely. THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1087 (1989).
35. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1988, at 21.
36. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1989, § 4, at 6, col. 4.
37. Freundlich & Silver, There's No Magic Bullet, But A Shotgun Approach
May Work, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 11, 1989, at 118. For a brief discussion of some
of the experimental drugs, including aerosol pentamidine, ganciclovir, and
erythropoietin, see, Garrett, AIDS; Treatment: The State of the Art, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 29, 1989, at 8.
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son has consulted a physician, that physician has discretion
whether to treat the patient, to refuse treatment, to refer the
patient to another physician, or to condition treatment on an
AIDS test. This discretion is legally, 8 as well as ethically lim-
ited. 9 This student article argues that a physician should not
refuse to treat a person merely on the basis of that person's
status as an infected individual.4 ° However the physician
should be allowed to condition treatment on an AIDS test.
II. THE TESTS USED TO DETECT AIDS INFECTION
Currently, three tests are used to screen for the AIDS
antibodies: 4' the enzyme-linked immunoabsorbent assay
(ELISA), the Western Blot (WB), and the immunofluorescence
assay (IFA). The ELISA is the most commonly used test.4 2 It
takes four hours if performed in-house, and costs anywhere
from ten to twenty dollars. The WB and IFA are both highly
interpretive (inference reliant) and, therefore, more time con-
suming (three days) and expensive (fifty to one hundred dol-
lars) tests. 43
38. Private practitioners may legally refuse treatment (emergencies and
ongoing relationships excepted) for any reason-whereas a physician
employed by a public hospital, a health maintenance organization (HMO), or
a private hospital with Hill-Burton or other federal funds may have a limited
discretionary role. See infra notes 164 to 176 and accompanying text.
39. A wholly independent ethical obligation exists irrespective of the
public/private characterization of a physician and will be discussed and
developed throughout this student article.
40. Indeed, the American Medical Association has come to accept this
notion. See infra notes 105 to 106 and accompanying text.
41. A new test, Recombigen HIV- 1 Latex Agglutination, was approved
by the FDA on December 14, 1988. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1988, at 16, col. 6.
The test takes five minutes to perform, and costs ten dollars. While the new
test costs less and takes less time, its results are no more accurate than those
of other tests currently available. The aim of this student article is to
demonstrate that testing can be required in some situations, and performed
in a non-discriminatory manner. Although the new test is faster and less
costly than the other tests mentioned, because it is not more accurate than
the others it will not be discussed in this article. For a discussion of the latex
agglutination test, see Quinn, Riggin, Kline, Francis, Mulanga, Sension, &
Fauci, Rapid Latex Agglutination Assay Using Recombinant Envelope Polypeptide for
the Detection of Antibody to the HIV, 260J. A.M.A. 510 (1988).
42. Interpretation and Use of the Western Blot Assay for Serodiagnosis of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Type I Infections, 38 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL:
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1 (Supp. S-7) (1989).
43. Update: Serologic Testing for Antibody to Human Immunodeficiency Virus,
36 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.
833-34 (1988).
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Factors used to determine whether a test is functioning
properly are the test's sensitivity and specificity. Sensitivity is
the degree to which a test yields accurate positive results.44
Specificity is the degree to which a test yields accurate negative
results. 45 The tests are not infallible, but are generally accurate
in predicting the presence or absence of the AIDS antibodies.46
According to a recent sample study,4 7 the three licensed
tests (ELISA, WB, and IFA) have respective sensitivity and
specificity percentages of 93.4 and 99.8, 99.6 and 99.2, and
98.9 and 99.6.48 This evidence suggests that, relative to labo-
ratory tests in general, the ELISA has a very high sensitivity
and specificity level,49 and thus, provides a relatively accurate
assessment of the infectious-status of the individual being
tested.
Nevertheless, the ELISA's predictive value and usefulness
are not as high as that of the other tests.5 ° Therefore, if a per-
son tests positive on an ELISA test, that person is given (at the
physician's discretion) a different test to ensure the predictive
value of the results. The following testing progression is com-
mon: if patients test negative on the ELISA, they are not tested
further; if they test positive, the ELISA is repeated; if they again
test positive, they are given the WB or the IFA (the norm is to
give the WB). 5 ' This progression testing is more accurate and
is, thus far, the best way to verify the validity of a positive
ELISA result. Because the tests administered in progression
testing are independent in terms of both their predictive value
and the manner in which their results are interpreted, one can
reasonably assume that the errors of the WB are mutually
exclusive of those of the ELISA.5 2 The costs and time associ-
ated with sequence testing are those resulting from the admin-
istration of the tests. Sequence testing does not require
additional blood samples or patient time.
The failure of the tests to do what they purport to do is
measured by the ratio of false positives (falsely identifying one
44. Howe, Why Mandatory Screening for AIDS is a Very Bad Idea, in C.
PIERCE & D. VAN DE VEER, AIDS AND PUBLIC POLICY 142 (1988).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Petricciani, Licensed Tests for Antibody to Human T- Lymphotropic Virus
Type III, 103 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 726-29 (1985).
48. Id. at 729.
49. Howe, supra note 44, at 143.
50. See supra note 47.
51. Howe, supra note 44, at 140-4 1.
52. See supra note 47.
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as seropositive), and the ratio of false negatives (falsely identi-
fying one as being free of seropositivity). This margin of error
can be dramatically reduced by using progression testing. Doc-
tors may avoid this time consuming and expensive conse-
quence by basing their judgments on the ELISA alone, or by
not testing. The possibility of either false positive or false neg-
ative results is an obvious burden to those undergoing a test,
and it is a reason for resisting such tests frequently cited by
opponents of routine testing.
Aside from sequence testing, a way to increase the reliabil-
ity of a given test is to first determine the status5" of the individ-
ual being tested. This initial step is useful because the
reliability of the results depends on whether one is testing
high-or low-risk groups, where "high" or "low" refer to the
prevalence of the AIDS virus in the group being tested. For
example, testing high-risk individuals, such as sexually active
and promiscuous homosexual males or intravenous drug users,
increases the predictive value of positive test results because of
the relatively high prevalence of AIDS infections within these
populations.54 The predictive value of negative results in test-
ing high risk groups, however, will be adversely affected
because high prevalence means a greater likelihood of false
negatives. 5 Another method to improve the accuracy of the
test would be to repeat the ELISA if a patient tests negative
and, if a doctor still doubts the validity of a test, to perform a
WB or IFA. These considerations are costly because of the
repetition of testing, and may be unnecessary.
In testing low-risk individuals, the predictive value of nega-
tive results increases relative to testing high-risk individuals,
whereas the predictive value of positive test results are
decreased. Similar to testing high risk groups, sequence test-
ing can increase the predictive value of positive or negative test
results when testing low-risk individuals.56
In brief, to determine whether a test is practical and serves
its intended purpose, several factors must be considered.
Those discussed have included the cost, the time factor and,
most importantly, the predictive value of the test.57 To
53. See HOWE, supra note 44, at 144. Status in this context refers to
whether the individual resides in a high risk area for the disease or is a
member of a high-risk group.
54. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
55. Howe, supra note 44, at 144.
56. Id.
57. Of course, other important factors such as, what will be done with
the test results by (a) doctors, (b) patients, and (c) the rest of us, are to be
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increase the predictive value, the cost and the time involved
must be increased simultaneously. These increased costs may
be worthwhile for one group of doctors and unnecessary for
another group.5 8 The subjective need for this increased cost of
medical care resulting from testing, and the predictive value of
the tests themselves are issues which are hotly debated.59
Competition, in terms of medical costs, may also dictate the
feasibility of testing. If Doctor A required testing and Doctor B
did not, all other things being equal, Doctor A's services will be
more costly and less likely to attract business. While doctors
may base their decisions with respect to how to treat their
patients upon the results of one of the AIDS tests, patients
should be apprised of their status, counselled, and encouraged
to undergo additional testing to verify or refute the results.
The next section discusses the history of physicians' will-
ingness to treat during epidemics and a study of ethical codes
of conduct relative to a doctor's obligation to treat patients.
III. GRANTING DOCTORS DISCRETION IN REQUIRING
ROUTINE TESTING
The onset of AIDS as an epidemic and its attendant
problems has stimulated an interest in how the medical profes-
sion has previously confronted epidemics.' Professor Daniel
Fox addressed two concerns relating to the historical treatment
of epidemics by the medical profession: how the medical pro-
fession collectively reacted towards patients with communica-
ble diseases, and how public policy affected that behavior."'
Professor Fox reported that "[d]espite enormous changes in
the practice of medicine and the social position of doctors over
the past five hundred years, there has been remarkable con-
tinuity in how the profession has responded to the threat of
contagion."62 While physicians appeared to have treated most
considered. These and other confidentiality concerns are discussed infra at
notes 78 to 89 and accompanying text.
58. For example, those doctors practicing in low risk geographic areas.
59. Wash. Post, Mar. 7, 1988, at C1; N.Y. Times, July 23, 1989, § 1, pt.
1, at 28, col. 4. See also, Woodward, Debate is on Over Treatment of AIDS Poor,
NEWSDAY, May 22, 1989, at 6 ("Gay activists increasingly are adopting a pro-
testing stance, deciding that the risk of discrimination is outweighed by the
benefits of early intervention.")
60. Fox, The Politics of Physician's Responsibility in Epidemics: A Note on
Histoiy, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT), April/May 1988, at
5.
61. Id. While the differences between general and sexual
communicability are great, they are not pertinent to this discussion.
62. Id.; see also Amundsen, Medical Deontology and Pestilential Disease in the
1990]
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of their patients, records illustrate many physicians fled their
cities in times of pestilence.6" While evidence of abandonment
by physicians is noteworthy, such evidence says nothing defini-
tive about whether such conduct violated prevailing ethical
norms, or the reasons for abandonment.'
Throughout history, two themes have stood out as provid-
ing incentives to the medical profession to treat patients:
negotiation and opportunity. 6 Negotiation occurred between
civic leaders and the medical profession as to who would treat
those diseased. Opportunity, in terms of fame and fortune,
accrued to physicians during times of plague - as did risk.66
Today, while a number of physicians are refusing to treat
AIDS-infected individuals,67 leaders of the medical profession,
and medical associations such as the American Medical Associ-
ation (AMA) have promulgated policies aimed at increasing
treatment. 68 Also, today's AIDS doctors, descendants of the
plague doctors, are rewarded with income, as well as greater
access to available research funds and academic status.69
Whether negotiation is occurring and opportunities are
accruing to doctors in the AIDS Era to the extent they did his-
torically is yet to be seen because of the currency of the disease.
IV. LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ROUTINE TESTING
The Supreme Court, when confronted with rights of pri-
vacy issues, has held that a right to privacy encompasses both a
general "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters," and an "interest in independence in making certain
Late Middle Ages, 32 J. OF THE HIST. OF MED. & ALLIED Sci. 403-21 (1977);
Loewy, Duties, Fears and Physicians, 12 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1363-66 (1986); Zuger
& Miles, Physicians, AIDS and Occupational Risk: Historic Traditions & Ethical
Obligations, 258J. A.M.A. 1924-28 (1987).
63. See Fox, supra note 60.
64. Id. at 5. Abandonment may have been justified at the time simply
because the current medicine at that time was powerless against a particular
disease.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 9. See also N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1990, at 1; N.Y. Times, Mar.
13, 1987, at 11.
68. See discussion on AMA's role, infra notes 100 to 106 and
accompanying text.
69. See Fox, supra, note 60, at 9. But see Arras, The Fragile Web of
Responsibility: AIDS and the Duty to Treat, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. (SPECIAL
SUPPLEMENT), April/May 1988, at 18, arguing that, because of fears of the
disease, some people are unlikely to praise physicians for steadfastly treating
infected individuals.
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kinds of important decisions."' ° A regulation regarding AIDS-
infected persons affects both the controlling of the disease and
the confidentiality of those who test positive when the regula-
tion seeks to identify AIDS carriers or to control AIDS-infected
persons, in terms of their sexual activities or their freedom of
movement. Any regulation seeking to infringe upon the pri-
vacy rights of an individual must be able to withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny by the courts.
Opponents to routine testing argue that a legislative grant
of discretion allowing doctors to routinely test their patients
would need to meet the strict scrutiny standard,7' because test-
ing a patient invades protected, fundamental rights. In order
to meet this test, the state, in enacting legislation, needs com-
pelling evidence to prove that the legislation is narrowly tai-
lored to promote a compelling state interest, and that the
chosen action is the least restrictive alternative.72 Because of
the inherent intrusion of testing, the legislation will need to go
beyond the minimum rationality test, which presumes that leg-
islation is valid unless it is not at least reasonably related to an
appropriate government regulation. 7' The legislation regard-
ing routine testing should measure up to a heightened scrutiny,
an intermediate level of scrutiny which requires that legislation
pertaining to a certain quasi-suspect class, or impairing impor-
tant, as opposed to fundamental, rights be substantially related
to an important state interest.7 4
Routine testing, analyzed under a constitutional lens must
meet the requirements of heightened scrutiny. Furthermore,
the laws promulgated for such testing must also be narrowly
construed because, although blood testing is a relatively minor
personal intrusion, 75 testing nevertheless infringes the individ-
70. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
71. See Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1274, 1287-89 (1986) (Because "'AIDS, or a suspicion of AIDS, can lead to
discrimination in employment, education, housing and even medical
treatment . . . . [n]othing short of compelling necessity can justify forcing
individuals to submit to blood tests that might cause such personal anguish.")
(quoting South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
72. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
73. See Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 380 (1915).
74. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that
gender classification qualified as a quasi-suspect class). The class sought to
be protected by the government, in this context, those people who are
infected with AIDS or those suspected of being infected, must be identified as
a "discrete and insular minority" as outlined in United States v. Carolene
Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
75. Schmerber v. State of Cal., 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (while a compelled
1990]
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ual's protected privacy "interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters."76 A compelling purpose is needed to justify
requiring an individual to submit to an AIDS test. This is espe-
cially true where the results may cause extreme personal anxi-
ety, as is true in this situation. Such a routine testing
requirement would need to have a close nexus with public
health or safety which would justify the measure.
In most day to day interactions, a routine testing require-
ment is not justifiable for the simple reason that AIDS is not
spread by casual contact,77 but by sexual contact, I.V. needle
sharing, and by perinatal, or other exchange or contact with
blood. In the health care context, where a procedure exists
that is risky (in terms of a possibility of transferring blood), the
nexus to health and safety could be met and a regulation could
be narrow enough so as not to be overinclusive. Because a
doctor choosing to test might be routinely testing all patients,
the regulation appears overinclusive. But inasmuch as the doc-
tor is testing for a valid purpose and testing only those under-
going a nonemergency, invasive procedure (a narrow or limited
purpose), a proposed regulation incorporating this narrow pur-
pose may well meet the strict scrutiny standard.
V. CONFIDENTIALITY CONCERNS
The right of privacy also extends to the confidentiality con-
cerns of a given patient. What a doctor will do with the infor-
mation that a given patient has tested positive will be as
important a privacy concern to the patient as will the test itself.
Many regulations have been proposed in this area from one
extreme, taking away all the privacy of an AIDS patient, 78 to the
other, allowing an AIDS patient to have absolute confidential-
ity.79 The same confidentiality concerns are present for report-
ing requirements as those for routine testing, but to a lesser
intrusion into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content is
deemed a Fourth Amendment search, the search is warranted because of the
compelling government interest).
76. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.
77. Gostin & Curran, Legal Control Measures for AIDS: Reporting
Requirements, Surveillance, Quarantine, and Regulation of Public Meeting Places, 77
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 214, 216 (1987); Recommendations for Preventing
Transmission of Infection with Human T-lymphotropic Virus Type III/
Lymphadenopathy-associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 682-95 (1985).
78. BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 25, 1985, at 9 (isolation of AIDS carriers
reportedly favored by 42 percent of the public).
79. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 199.33 (West 1986); 1986
Mass. Acts 241.
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degree because of the obvious link to public health and safety
where reporting is done only to the proper authorities.
Doctors are limited in what they can do with information
about the seropositive status of a particular patient. Currently
a doctor must report the patient's status to the health authori-
ties only if the patient has CDC-defined AIDS.8 0 The doctor
has discretion to tell the patient's spouse or partner that he or
she may be at risk of contracting the disease." Doctors should
have discretion to tell other staff who will be directly involved
with that patient.
In addition to the health and safety concerns of the
patient, the doctor, and the health care staff, physicians may
have a duty to warn others they know may be at risk of con-
tracting the disease.8" Physicians have a duty to protect known,
foreseeable victims of a dangerous patient, including a duty to
warn the identified third party.8" In the context of communica-
ble diseases, a physician also has a duty to warn family mem-
bers, or significant others of the infected patient's status,
resulting in tort liability for failure to so warn. 4 Individuals
entitled to warning are those specific persons in foreseeable
danger of contracting an infection from the physician's
patient.8 5 If a physician chooses to require testing and a
patient is seropositive, the physician has a duty to warn the
spouse or partner of the patient's infection should the patient
refuse to do so.86 This is ajustification for testing because if an
infected patient refuses to warn his or her loved one or partner
and the physician does warn that person, the physician is
preventing the spread of the disease. 7
80. Gostin & Curran, supra note 77, at 215.
81. The doctor may not tell the spouse or significant other the name of
the patient (but in most cases, this is irrelevant).
82. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 529 P.2d 553 (1974), aff'd on rehearing, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976); Annotation, Liability of One Treating Mentally
Afflicted Patient for Failure to Warn or Protect Third Persons Protected by Patient, 83
A.L.R.3d 1201 (1978 & Supp. 1987).
83. Tarasoff at 123, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 135, 529 P.2d at 559.
84. See Gill v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 337 So. 2d 420 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
85. See Knier v. Albany Medical Center Hosp., 131 Misc. 2d 414, 500
N.Y.S.2d 490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); Derrick v. Ontario Community Hosp., 47
Cal. App. 3d 145, 120 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1975).
86. See Knier and Derrick, supra note 85. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 2,
1988, sec. 6 (Magazine), at 67, col. 1, (doctor advised patient to tell pregnant
wife of his status).
87. See Knier and Derrick, supra note 85.
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When the names of those infected are reported to the
health authorities, a greater privacy concern is at stake. While
the reporting requirements are an important and valid concern
of those at risk, determining whether the names of those
infected ought to be reported to the health authorities is
beyond the scope of this student article.88 Perhaps doctors
ought to be required to report all seropositives, and the CDC
should begin reporting ARC and HIV-positive cases. This
issue is beyond the scope of this student article but a law that
required this type of reporting would not invade anyone's
rights and would work to give the public a more accurate pic-
ture of the seriousness of the disease.
A physician should warn staff who are immediately
involved in the nonemergency, invasive procedure for the pur-
pose of protecting their health and safety. While the staff's
right to know the status of a particular patient is not as strong
as that of a doctor, they also should be apprised of the infec-
tious status of the patient with whom they are dealing. Some-
thing is inherently wrong with a system that expects people to
risk their lives to help others, but does not allow them to know
the risks. If a doctor chooses to test and discovers that a
patient is infected, he or she should be able to tell those who
will be involved directly with the patient. The staff cannot
infringe on the doctor-patient privilege and demand to know,
but a doctor, if he or she feels the risk involved is high, ought
to tell his or her staff.
Finally, the concern, if any, of whether a doctor will
divulge the infectious status of a patient to the general public
should be avoided because of the doctor-patient privilege,
which affords a patient a powerful cause of action where the
doctor divulges information.8 9
VI. ETHICAL CODES OF CONDUCT RELATING TO A PHYSICIAN'S
DUTY TO TREAT
Today's several ethical codes of conduct dictate certain
ethical behavior by a doctor. The Hippocratic Oath is the most
ancient and recognized ethical code of conduct. This oath was
promulgated by Hippocrates, a Greek physician in 400 B.C.,
and is a widely used ethical guide for the medical profession.
88. For a discussion of reporting requirements see Gostin & Curran,
supra note 77, at 215, and Gostin & Ziegler, A Review of AIDS-Related Legislative
and Regulatory Policy in the United States, 15 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 5, 10
(1987).
89. See infra note 90.
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Hippocrates believed that physicians have a serious obligation
to serve their patients.9 ° The oath is often administered as a
part of the graduation ceremonies at medical schools. While
the Hippocratic Oath does not address physicians' rights to
know the health status of an individual, or their right to require
testing, it does require physicians to care for their patients.
VII. CHRISTIANITY AND THE CALL TO LOVE ONE'S NEIGHBOR
Christians are called to love God, and the proof of our love
of God is the love we bear for our neighbor.9 1 Thus, if one
claims to love God and simultaneously hates a neighbor, such a
person is a liar.92 Jesus taught us that the Good Samaritan who
reached out to the man beaten by robbers and dressed his
wounds was the only one worthy to be called neighbor.9 "
In the parable of the Good Samaritan, a lawyer, attempting
to tempt Jesus, asked Him: "who is my neighbor?"9 4 Jesus
answered this question in a parable about a man who, while en
route from Jerusalem to Jericho, fell among thieves who
90. The Hippocratic Oath states:
I swear . . . that I will fulfill according to my ability and
judgment this oath and this covenant; ...
I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick
according to my ability and judgment; I will keep them from harm
and injustice.
I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor
will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not give to a
woman an abortive remedy. In purity and in holiness I will guard
my life and my art.
Whatever houses I may visit, I will come for the benefit of the
sick, remaining free of all intentional injustice .....
What I may see or hear in the course of treatment or even
outside of the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no
account one must spread abroad, I will keep myself holding such
things shameful to be spoken about.
If I fulfill this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted to me
to enjoy life and art, being honored with fame among all men [and
women] for all time to come; if I transgress it and swear falsely, may
the opposite of all this be my lot.
The Hippocratic Oath, in L. EDELSTEIN, ANCIENT MEDICINE, (0. Temkin & C.L.
Temkin eds. 1967).
91. See Matt. 22:36-40: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy
heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind... [and] [t]hou shalt love
your neighbour as thyself"; see also John 13:34: "A new commandment I give
unto you, That ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one
another."
92. 1 John 2:9.
93. Luke 10:36-37.
94. Id.
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stripped him and wounded him, leaving him half dead. Jesus
told us that three men saw the half dead man on their journey.
The first, a priest or rabbi saw him and passed on the other
side. Likewise, a levite (an assistant to a priest) who came and
looked on him passed by on the other side. Finally, a samari-
tan, as he journeyed, saw the man and had compassion for him.
He dressed his wounds, set him on his own beast and brought
him to an inn and took care of him. When the samaritan
departed the next morning, he took out two silver pieces, gave
them to the innkeeper and asked the innkeeper to take care of
the injured man and told him that he would repay the cost on
his return journey.
Jesus asked the lawyer which of the three in the parable
was a neighbor. The lawyer answered correctly and identified
the samaritan as the neighbor. Jesus then told him to go and
do the same.9 5
On its face, the story of the Good Samaritan is nothing
more than a story of someone who did a good deed. It is obvi-
ously that, but its significance is much deeper. The road to
Jericho was very dangerous at that time. The road was
hounded by robbers, vandals and the like. In fact, only a fool
would travel the road alone. The story basically revolved
around a man who caused his own downfall.96 The story's sig-
nificance is in its implication that we have a responsibility to
help others in need. The story illustrated the evils of prejudice
and taught the benefits of true neighborliness. "It is simple for
one to help another whose problems result from a tragedy or
from the ill will of others. But where one causes his or her own
downfall, we tend to have little sympathy."-97
Jesus told this story to illustrate to the people of the day
that the ill will they felt towards others was a denial of the faith
God had given them. One scholar summarized this story as fol-
lows: "Contempt, even toward the foolish, has no place in the
Kingdom of God."98
The plight of those infected with AIDS can be analogized
to the victim in the parable of the Good Samaritan. The per-
ception of many is that those infected with AIDS have brought
95. Id.
96. While I do not assert that people who have contracted AIDS are
fools or that they brought about their own downfall, I do submit that even if
this were true, we, as human beings, have a moral responsibility to help those
infected with the AIDS virus.
97. Homily by Monsignor John J. Egan, Holy Name Cathedral,
Chicago, Ill., July 16, 1989.
98. Id.
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the disease on themselves and deserve their lot.99 This percep-
tion is clearly wrong because, for example, AIDS afflicts chil-
dren born to infected mothers, and recipients of infected
blood: people who are victims in the truest sense of the word.
Fear, scorn, and misunderstanding have kept some, otherwise
able to do so, from lending a helping hand to AIDS sufferers,
as they kept the priest and levite from helping the injured man.
Jesus taught us, through this story, that those who subscribe to
such a laissez faire attitude in the context of AIDS, or in any
situation where a need is present, are breaking the most impor-
tant of the Commandments.
Doctors as human beings have the moral obligations
required of all of us. Having achieved the status of a profes-
sional, however, doctors have an additional obligation towards
the sick. Upon graduation from medical school, a doctor
agrees to abide by an ethical code of conduct such as the Hip-
pocratic oath. Such an obligation or duty should not be
brushed off by those holding such high esteem in society
merely because a person is afflicted with the AIDS virus. The
crux of this article is that while physicians have a right to know
with whom they are dealing, and to take the necessary precau-
tions, they do not possess the right to turn away an AIDS-
infected individual merely on the basis of that infection. They
have, in fact, a duty to treat infected individuals.
VIII. THE AMA's ROLE: PAST AND POTENTIAL INFLUENCE
The AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs issued a
statement in December of 1986 that related to the duty to treat
AIDS-infected individuals. Through this statement, the AMA
instituted an "emotional inability" standard, 0 which appeared
to recognize that not all physicians would be able to cope with
the treatment of AIDS-infected individuals. The statement was
vague and couched in generalities but the message was clear:
99. E. FEE & D. Fox, AIDS - THE BURDENS OF HISTORY 122 (1988).
100. The portion of the statement which relates to a physician's duty to
treat states:
Physicians and other health professionals have a long tradition
of tending to patients afflicted with infectious disease with
compassion and courage. However, not everyone is emotionally
able to care for patients with AIDS. If the health professional is
unable to care for a patient with AIDS, that individual should ask to
be removed from the case. Alternative arrangements for the care of
the patient must be made.
A.M.A., COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, STATEMENT ON AIDS
(1986).
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physicians could ethically reject patients on grounds of their
AIDS status, so long as the physicians were "unable to care for
a patient with AIDS."'' The vagueness of the emotional
inability exception made illusory any ethical obligation to pro-
vide care. After all, there are no legal standards by which to
discern the difference between being emotionally unable as
compared to feeling emotionally unable, or simply claiming emo-
tional inability irrespective of whether the doctor is in fact emo-
tionally unable.10 2
The AMA's 1986 statement did not comport with an ethi-
cal obligation of a physician's duty to treat the ill. People
understood the statement to mean that a physician was gener-
ally free to accept or refuse patients, even arbitrarily and even
though no other physician was available.'0 3 The AMA's 1986
statement did not consider any legal duty to treat on the part of
doctors. While no legally-mandated duty on the part of private
physicians to treat exists, there is also no general right, cate-
gorically, to discriminate solely on the basis of AIDS infection.
Notwithstanding the AMA's denial of a general obligation for
doctors to treat all patients, the AMA faced both pragmatic as
well as ethical motivations to issue a new statement. 0 4
In December 1987, the AMA's Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs issued a subsequent statement that implied a
change of heart over that of the previous statement. 05 While
101. As will be discussed, infra notes 164 to 176 and accompanying
text, physicians employed by a public hospital, a Hill-Burton hospital (a
hospital that is federally funded), or a health maintenance organization
(HMO), do not have such wide discretion in deciding who to treat, because of
contractual obligations.
102. Freedman, Health Professions, Codes, and the Right to Refuse to Treat
HIV-Infectious Patients, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT),
April/May 1988, at 23. While there are discernible distinctions, they are not
legally discernible.
103. Id. See also Arras, supra note 69, at 18 (while some physicians are
refusing to treat AIDS victims, most have treated them). But see N.Y. Times,
Apr. 23, 1990, at 1 ("[b]ecause most physicians still do not take on patients
who have [AIDS], the growing number of infected people must often
compete to get treatment from the small, overworked cadre of doctors who
will accept them.").
104. See Freedman, supra note 102, at 24.
105. This new statement read in its relevant portions:
A physician may not ethically refuse to treat a patient whose
condition is within the physician's current realm of competence
solely because the patient is seropositive. The tradition of the
American Medical Association, since its organization in 1847, is that:
"when an epidemic prevails, a physician must continue his labors
without regard to the risk to his own health..... Physicians should
respond to the best of their abilities in cases of emergency where
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this new statement did not specifically overrule the previous
emotional inability standard, its focus shifted from a justifica-
tion to refuse treatment entirely, to a justification to refer treat-
ment to other qualified doctors.'0 6 This new statement
comported with an ethical standard for a physician, by implying
a general obligation to treat AIDS-infected patients.
A doctor may, therefore, legally and ethically refer an
infected patient to another doctor who may have a greater
degree of competence in the field, but he ought not turn away a
patient simply because that patient has contracted AIDS.
Do codes of ethics equal rules of law in their binding effect
or do they merely pay lip-service to an ideal value system on
the part of physicians? The answer to this is at least suggested
by the AMA's willingness to change its stance on the duty to
treat. While political and other motivations undoubtedly sug-
gested the need to change the original statement, 0 7 a mere
change in statement with an adherence to the belief that doc-
tors can refuse treatment for any reason will not satisfy the
intent of such a promulgation. When an association such as the
AMA promulgates rules or codes of conduct, one would expect
its members to abide by those rules of conduct. One author
wrote of codes of medical ethics that they "can reasonably be
expected to reflect the basic ethical views of the organizations
that have endorsed them."' 0 8 Thus, the AMA can reasonably
be expected to be answerable to its promulgated rule in the
1987 statement, and physicians should be required to treat
AIDS-infected patients unless they are incompetent to do so (in
first aid treatment is essential, and physicians should not abandon
patients whose care they have undertaken ....
Principle VI of the 1980 Principle of Medical Ethics states that
"A physician shall in the provision of appropriate patient care,
except in emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with whom
to associate and the environment in which to provide medical
services." The Council has always interpreted this Principle as not
supporting illegal or invidious discrimination .... Thus, it is the
view of the Council that Principle VI does not permit categorical
discrimination against a patient solely on his or her seropositivity. A
physician who is not able to provide the services required by persons
with AIDS should make an appropriate referral to those physicians
or facilities that are equipped to provide such services.
A.M.A., COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, ETHICAL ISSUES
INVOLVED IN THE GROWING AIDS CRISIS (1987).
106. Id.
107. For example, fear of governmental regulation over the medical
profession.
108. Veatch, Codes of Medical Ethics: Ethical Analysis, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BIOETHICS 172 (W. Reich & L. Walters, eds. 1978).
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which case these physicians are to refer the patients to compe-
tent physicians).
Two circumstances warrant a legally binding obligation to
provide care: emergencies and ongoing doctor patient rela-
tionships.'0 9 Treatment is guaranteed to patients in either cir-
cumstance regardless of a physician's fears or idiosyncracies.
However, qualifications exist which will be discussed after an
analysis of each of the exceptions to a private doctor's broad
discretion in choosing patients.
A. Continuing Relationship Between Physician and Patient
A physician generally has no legal obligation to accept all
persons who seek his services.' 1o The reason for this freedom
is that the relationship between a physician and his or her
patient is in part a contractual one. Insofar as it is a contract, it
is a consensual venture,"' and arises - as do all contractual
relationships - from an express or implied contract." 2 The
consensual nature of this relationship absolves the private phy-
sician from legal obligation for failing or refusing to accept a
patient for treatment. " A physician may also exclude certain
diseases from his or her practice."' Thus, emergency contexts
aside, a patient's only right to treatment and a private physi-
cian's only duty to treat arises after a consensual relationship is
established between that patient and the physician. "' Once
this duty arises, it continues until:
1. the agreement is terminated by mutual consent;
109. See Freedman, supra note 102, at 23; see also Lo, Obligations to Care
for Persons with Human Immunodeficieny Virus, 4 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 367, 376-77
(1988).
110. Lyons v. Grether, 218 Va. 630, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1983)
("unless required by statute, a physician has no legal obligation to accept as a
patient all persons who seek his services"); see also Findlay v. Board of
Superiors, 72 Ariz. 58, 230 P.2d 526 (1951); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind.
416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901); Childers v. Frye, 201 N.C. 42, 158 S.E. 744 (1931).
11. United Calendar Mfg. Corp. v. Huang, 94 A.D.2d 176, 179, 403
N.Y.S.2d 497, 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) ("The relationship of physician and
patient is a consensual one .... ")
112. Id.; see also Lyons, 239 S.E.2d 105, ("although a patient is entitled
to damages resulting from breach of a physician's duty, this duty arises only
upon creation of a physician/patient relationship which springs from a
consensual transaction, a contract express or implied."); McNamera v.
Emmons, 36 Cal. App.2d 199, 204, 97 P.2d 503, 507 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1939).
113. Lo, supra note 109, at 376-77. See also Childers, 201 N.C. at 45, 158
S.E. at 746.
114. Lo, supra note 109, at 377.
115. Annas, Legal Risks and Responsibilities of Physicians in the AIDS
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2. the agreement is terminated by the patient;
3. the physician's services are no longer required (pre-
sumably for that ailment); or
4. the physician withdraws after reasonable notice to the
patient. 116
A contractual relationship between a physician and a
patient can be created in several ways. The simplest example
of such a relationship is when a physician agrees to examine or
treat the patient (regardless of whether the treatment is for
AIDS-related care), upon a face-to-face confrontation. Other
examples may include family-doctor relationships," 7 or the
case in which a physician accepts an appointment with a person
where the specific condition was mentioned when making the
appointment." 8
Thus, once physicians undertake the obligation to care for
patients, they may not legally abandon or refuse to treat those
patients on the basis that those patients are AIDS-infected indi-
viduals, at least not without reasonable notice." 9 If the physi-
cians are not qualified to treat a particular patient, they must
refer that patient to a qualified physician. 120
B. Emergency Treatment Duty 121
Hospitals that offer emergency services are required to
treat all patients who require emergency care,1 2 2 regardless of
wealth, sex, color, religion, or, presumably, AIDS-status. 23
Epidemic, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT), April/May 1988,
at 27.
116. Id. (emphasis in original).
117. A physician's prior treatment of a patient, however, will not
necessarily place a legal obligation to treat a new illness. Hurley, 59 N.E. at
1058.
118. Lyons, 239 S.E.2d at 105.
119. Professor Annas believes that a distinction exists between an HIV-
infected patient and one with AIDS or ARC in this situation because treating
AIDS or ARC involves the "knowledge and skill needed to treat a specific
disease; [while] treating an HIV-infected patient involves knowing what
precautions to take to avoid infection, while treating a different, usually
unrelated condition." See Annas, supra note 115, at 27. This distinction is
relevant only when the doctor is aware of the status of the patient.
120. Id. There is no such requirement if the physician owes no
continuing care duty to the patient. Where this duty is absent, emergency
contexts aside, a physician may legally refuse care even when there is no
alternative treatment source in the community.
121. While this duty will not likely apply to a private physician, it will
apply to a private hospital with an emergency room facility.
122. SeeAnnas, supra note 115, at 26.
123. Id. at 27.
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The emergency room staff should take the CDC's recom-
mended precautions, but the protections taken can neither
amount to a refusal of treatment, nor compromise adequate
patient care. 124 The emergency rule may have limited applica-
bility when applied to AIDS-infected individuals because the
obligation to treat does not extend beyond the emergency
room setting. 125
Thus, unless there is an established relationship with the
physician, some statutory requirement, 12 6 or an emergency sit-
uation, doctors have no legal duty to provide and patients have
no legal right to receive medical care in the United States. The
law's tolerance of such limited access to medical care is dis-
graceful indeed, but "by refusing to grant universal access to
health care and medical services to AIDS and HIV-infected
patients, we are treating them no differently than anyone
else."' 127
C. Opponents and Proponents of Routine AIDS Testing
There has been much debate about whether a doctor
ought to be able to condition treatment on an AIDS test,12 or
whether AIDS testing ought to be limited to the screening of
the blood supply and for the military.'29 Routine testing for
the AIDS virus is not without faults. There are many who have
124. Id. This is the reason why the scope of this student article does
not extend into the emergency room. Even the five minute, latex
agglutination, AIDS test would have no impact on the duty to provide care in
a hospital emergency room setting, because conditioning care on the taking
of the test would amount to a refusal of treatment (where the patient refuses
to comply with the test requirement).
125. Id.
126. See infra notes 164 to 176 and accompanying text.
127. See Annas, supra note 115, at 27.
128. Bauer, AIDS Testing, 2 AIDS AND PUB. POL'Y J. 1, Winter 1987,
("Routine testing . . .is a necessary first step in [containing epidemics]");
Cruz, Physicians in Private Practice: Can They Require Patients to Undergo an AIDS
Test?, 36 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q 359 (1990) ("if a [private] physician is under
no affirmative duty to treat all those who request treatment .... then it could
be argued that he can condition such treatment .... [upon] an AIDS test.");
N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1987, at 12, col. 1 ("problems [of whether to test] don't
have nice black and white answers. One should not deceive oneself that a
single edict is going to resolve all the complexities, nor should that be an
excuse for inaction.").
129. Fletcher, AIDS Screening: A Response to Gary Bauer, 2 AIDS & PuB.
POL'Y J. 5 (1987); Fumento, Chicken Little with a Hypodermic, REASON, Nov.
1988, at 31, 32; Gostin & Curran, AIDS Screening, Confidentiality, and the Duty to
Warn, 77 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 361 (1987); Gostin & Ziegler, A Review of AIDS-
Related Legislative and Regulatory Policy in the United States, 15 LAw, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 5, at 10 (1987).
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voiced concerns about screening for the virus.'o Their reason-
ing has been both constitutionally-based, because of the intru-
sion involved in testing and the availability of less intrusive
alternatives, and based on the potential pitfalls of the test itself.
Opponents of routine testing argue that requiring testing
as a condition to treatment invades privacy rights of the indi-
vidual,' and that it should be limited to situations such as
screening the blood supply, where the testing does not infringe
on any particular individual's rights.' 3 2 Others stress the
uncertainty of the test results and the lengthy incubation
period of the disease as a reason not to require testing.13 3
Others argue that in light of the high cost of testing, the
currently incurable aspect of AIDS, and the infringement of the
privacy concerns of the individual being tested, the test's pit-
falls outweigh the benefits derived from testing and serve only
to discriminate against those tested. 3 4 There is also a fear that
routine testing may take away the incentive to seek medical
care.'3 5 This fear is that if people who seek medical care are
tested against their will (including those who succumb to test-
ing because they need medical attention and cannot get it
otherwise), those who are discovered to be infected would be
less likely than those who submit to voluntary testing to change
their habits or to stop infecting others.3 6
Opponents of routine testing in the health care context
use as their premise statistics demonstrating that the percent-
age of health care workers with AIDS is no higher than that of
the general population. '3 7 These statistics imply that health
care workers are no more at risk of contracting AIDS than is a
random member of the general population, which implication
vitiates the justification to test based on the greater risk to
doctors.
Finally, opponents of routine testing argue that doctors
ought to follow the CDC recommendations favoring the use of
universal precautions rather than routinely testing patients.
130. See Gostin & Ziegler, supra note 129.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Howard, HIV Screening - Scientific, Ethical, and Legal Issues, 9 J.
LEGAL MED. 601, 603-05 (1988).
134. M. SANDE & P. VOLBERDING, THE MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF AIDS
51 (1988).
135. Id.
136. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1988, § B, at 1, col. 3.
137. Update. Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Among Health-Care Workers, 37 CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 229 (1988).
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The CDC has issued recommendations favoring the use of uni-
versal precautions, "appropriate barrier precautions to prevent
skin and mucous-membrane exposure when contact with blood
or other bodily fluid is anticipated," over routine testing in the
care of all patients.'38 These universal precautions include
wearing surgical gloves, masks, protective eyewear, aprons, and
gowns. 13 9 The argument is that since these recommendations
apply in the care of all patients and are much less intrusive than
testing, the purpose of testing must be to discriminate.
Proponents of testing argue that because of the inherent
risks to doctors while performing invasive procedures, those
doctors who believe it necessary to do so, ought to know the
status of their patients. Legitimate reasons exist for testing in
the doctor-patient context, notwithstanding the formidable
arguments against testing. Testing may be routinely per-
formed if done in a non-discriminatory manner and if the infor-
mation is used to benefit the doctor, his or her staff, and the
patient: that is, to counsel the seropositive patient, and to
inform him or her of any treatments currently available.
Some proponents of testing have gone too far. They have
demanded it in every context - even nationwide testing, 4 °
using as their justification that the rights of an AIDS carrier
must give way to the interests of health and safety of society in
general. Notwithstanding these far-reaching alternatives, there
are legitimate reasons for testing.
AIDS tests have been and may continue to be required for
several appropriate purposes. AIDS tests are currently
required of all donors of blood, sperm and organs, 141 for all
applicants to the military, 142 peace corps, 143 and the foreign
service,144 and for immigrants seeking residency in the United
States. 145 Some states have passed regulations requiring AIDS
tests to be administered to prisoners, 146 those getting mar-
138. Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health Care
Settings, 36 CENTERS FOR DiSEASE COi'rROL: MORBIDrIY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 6 (Supp. S-2) (1987).
139. Id. at 5.
140. E. FEE & D. Fox, supra note 99, at 158.
141. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1989, § A, at 1, col. 1; (in fact, New York rules
require all sperm to be frozen for at least six months before it is used to allow
a second AIDS test to be made on the donor).
142. N.Y. Times, June 24, 1987, § A, at 22, col. 4.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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ried, 1 4 7 upon request by a rape victim,1 48 upon request by
police officers or firemen who have been bitten or spit upon, 49
and prostitutes.' ° Some religious orders have also instituted
testing."15 AIDS testing has also been encouraged for any
woman contemplating pregnancy.1
52
Doctors should have discretion whether to condition treat-
ment on an AIDS test in order to have all relevant information
about each person they treat, because of the inherent risks
present while performing a non-emergency, invasive proce-
dure, and because of the potential benefit to the patient of
being aware of his or her AIDS status.
While universal precautions promote health and safety in
the health industry, even with their use, physicians may wish to
take additional precautions when confronted with AIDS-
infected patients. In other words, when physicians know they
are treating infected individuals, they can exercise a greater
degree of caution than they would normally exercise in the care
of an uninfected patient. 53 A further problem is that precau-
tions such as surgical gloves may themselves be risky to use,' 54
because they are very tightly worn and may be easily punctured
by the razor sharp instruments common in the operating room.
The precautions are also likely to be ignored in what appears to
be a safe situation.
Physicians should also be apprised of their patients' infec-
tious conditions so that they can best help their patients. An
interest in the well being of the patient is a prerequisite to the
ability to justify the need for the test. Physicians can help
infected patients by informing them about medications and
treatments available, by disseminating information about the
virus including symptoms to expect and preventative advice,
and by providing counseling to patients prior to the test and
after the results are known. If physicians are not up to date on
the virus, they may refer their patients to other physicians or to
147. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 40, para. 204 (1988), repealed by 1989 Ill. Legis.
Serv. 86-884 (West).
148. Chicago Trib., Jun. 7, 1989, § C, at 1.
149. Id.
150. Chicago Trib.,Jan. 2, 1989, § C, at 5; but see Chicago Trib., Aug. 4,
1989, § C, at 1 (Illinois State Law ruled unconstitutional).
151. Florida Catholic, Dec. 16, 1988.
152. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1987, § B, at 4, col. 5.
153. Pellegrino, HIV Infection and the Ethics of Clinical Care, 10 J. LEGAL
MED. 29, 41; Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 1987, at Z6.
154. While this assertion is true regardless of whether the physician is
apprised of the infectious status of the individual, it demonstrates the
possible pitfalls of a blind adherence to these precautions.
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other organizations that can supply the patients with the infor-
mation or care.
Additionally, physicians should know the HIV-status of
their patients in order to apprise other health care workers who
are at risk of contracting the virus: assisting physicians, nurses,
orderlies, and other staff who are at risk of coming in contact
with an infected patient's bodily fluids. Moreover, physicians
may help stem the spread of the AIDS virus by counseling sero-
positive patients to warn spouses or others immediately at risk.
Indeed if the patient refuses to warn the affected parties, the
physician may have a duty to so warn.' 55
Many of the rationales against testing appear to be aimed
towards testing in the general context. This opposition tends
to look at testing in a vacuum and seems to assume that all who
favor testing do so in any and all contexts. Nationwide testing
is patently wrong and should be avoided because those discov-
ered to be infected would be highly susceptible to discrimina-
tion. Nationwide testing would also stigmatize many more than
it would benefit, and would be highly inefficient.' 56 Testing in
the employment context is also unfounded (depending on the
job) because medical science has shown that AIDS is not casu-
ally transmitted. 57 There are many valid reasons to oppose
routine testing in a given context: even in non-emergency,
invasive procedures. For example, confidentiality of a person's
seropositive status is a major concern because of the fear that if
one tests positive then he or she will lose employment opportu-
nities,158 face the possibility of eviction from his or her
home,' 59 lose health and/or life insurance, 6 ° and will be dis-
criminated against in other ways. This possibility clearly must
be avoided.
Those who oppose routine testing point out that a way to
protect confidentiality is to encourage voluntary testing. How-
ever, voluntary testing will not necessarily protect confidential-
ity. It cannot make any difference whether the test results came
155. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
156. E.g., the Illinois AIDS testing requirement for those seeking a
marriage license in that state, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 204 (1988), is now
repealed. 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. 86-884 (West). The testing requirement was
repealed because it was highly inefficient. Only 52 cases were diagnosed
among the estimated 250,000 tested since the law took effect on January 1,
1988. Chicago Trib. Sept. 12, 1989, § C, at 1.
157. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 17, at 6, 62-63.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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from a volunteer or from one routinely tested. The same doc-
tor-patient privilege applies, and the same medical malpractice
liability will accrue to the physician who divulges the informa-
tion regardless of whether the doctor encouraged volunteer
testing or whether the doctor routinely tested for AIDS.
Early detection of AIDS is crucial to an infected person
because, although the AIDS virus is currently incurable, the
drugs which have been developed and approved are most effec-
tive in the early stages of the disease; 6 ' they lose their useful-
ness as the disease spreads and destroys a greater portion of
the immune system.' 62 While the incubation period of the dis-
ease is also a concern, because the test may not be able to
detect the antibodies to the virus for a variable period of
time, 6 ' it should not be an argument against testing because
testing will at least detect some if not most seropositives at an
early stage of infection. A physician should still take the pre-
cautions recommended by the CDC if a patient tests negative.
The debate is not whether physicians should use the universal
precautions, but whether they will naturally take greater care
when knowingly treating one who is infected with the virus.
IX. SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 -
LEGAL DUTY TO TREAT
Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(hereinafter, Rehabilitation Act) is legislation enacted for the
purpose of protecting individuals with real or perceived handi-
caps. 164 The purpose of the Rehabilitation Act is to prohibit
discrimination against "otherwise qualified" handicapped per-
sons, solely on the basis of their handicap, by any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance. 165 The Rehabili-
tation Act is important in the AIDS context because, where
applicable, it imposes a legal duty to treat infected individuals.
161. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
162. Id.
163. Sexually Transmitted Diseases Treatment Guidelines, 38 CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL; MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1 (Supp. S-8
1989); see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS:
DIRECTIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND RESEARCH 1, (1986).
164. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 (codified, as amended at 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796 (West Supp. 1988)).
165. Id. § 794. A handicapped person is "qualified" for purposes of
the Rehabilitation Act when "with reasonable accommodation [he or she] can
perform the essential functions of the job in question." 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(k)(1) (1985).
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A person is handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act
when he or she "(i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment."' 66 In the employ-
ment context, persons with AIDS have been held to fit within
the definition of "handicapped individual" provided that they
do not pose a threat of contagion to their fellow workers. 167
Therefore, persons with AIDS, at least in the employment con-
text, are entitled to the protections of the Rehabilitation Act. 168
A careful interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act by the federal
166. Id. § 706(8)(B).
167. See Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376,
381 (C.D. Cal. 1987); District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ.,
130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 336 (1986).
168. Section 504, supra note 164, considerations are important because
the Rehabilitation Act protects individuals against discrimination in programs
receiving federal funding. In School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987),
the United States Supreme Court, in a decision dealing with a school teacher
with tuberculosis, made clear that the Act protects those suffering from a
symptomatic viral infection. Arline is limited in two ways: it only dealt with
symptomatic conditions; and it only encompassed the employment sector.
Even though the Court refused to state whether an asymptomatic carrier
is similarly protected, Arline, 480 U.S. at 282, the Department ofJustice, in a
memorandum, concluded that Section 504 protects symptomatic as well as
asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals against discrimination in any
federally funded program or activity, so long as the infected individual is
"otherwise qualified" to participate in the program or activity. See infra note
170. The Department of Justice opinion extends to the employment as well
as the non-employment sector, meaning that its opinion encompasses health
care organizations' health care functions. The notable difference between
employment situations and non-employment situations is in the treatment of
the "otherwise qualified" standard. In the non-employment context, the
"otherwise qualified" standard used is that set forth in Arline, which is a
determination of the nature and the severity of the risk, and the probability
that the disease will be transmitted. In the employment context, the Civil
Rights Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31 (1988),
which prohibits discrimination if the infected individual is able to perform the
duties of the job and does not constitute a direct threat to the health and
safety of others, replaces the Arline standard for its own "otherwise qualified"
standard.
Because this comment's focus is in the non-employment context, namely,
a patient visiting a doctor for a nonemergency invasive procedure, we will
need to look to the Arline standard of "otherwise qualified" which looks to:
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted),
(b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious),
(c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third
parties) and
(d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause
varying degrees of harm.
Memo from Assistant Attorney General Kmiec on Application of Rehabilitation Act's Sec-
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courts,' 69 the Department of Justice,17 0 and noted scholars,' 7'
has dispelled the legal question of whether being an infected
individual is within the definition of handicapped individual
under the Rehabilitation Act.
Courts have not yet addressed whether an AIDS victim is
considered handicapped under the Act, while in a public or pri-
vate hospital which receives Hill-Burton funds, federal funds
which trigger the protections of the Rehabilitation Act. 172
tion 504 to HIV-Infected Persons, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at D- 1 (Oct. 7,
1988).
169. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1986); Chalk v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 840 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1988) (absolute certainty that transmission
was not possible from schoolroom or workplace contact was not necessary to
provide protection under the Rehabilitation Act).
170. Memo from Assistant Attorney General Kmiec on Application of.
Rehabilitation Act's Section 504 to HIV-Infected Persons, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 195, at D-I (Oct. 7, 1988). (Assistant Attorney General Kmiec found that
persons with AIDS are protected under the Rehabilitation Act even though
AIDS is a contagious disease, and that those HIV-infected who are
asymptomatic are handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act.)
171. See Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right
to Know" the Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD. L. REV. 12, 44-45
(1989); Leonard, AIDS, Employment and Unemployment, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 929,
931-39 (1989).
172. Pub. L. No. 79-725, Title VI of Public Health Service Act, August
1946. The general purpose of the Act is:
to assist the several States in the carrying out of their programs for
the construction and modernization of such public or other medical
facilities as may be necessary,... to furnish adequate hospital, clinic,
or similar services to all their people;
The general regulations of the Act are:
that the State plan shall provide for adequate hospitals, and other
facilities for which aid under this part is available, for all persons
residing in the State, and adequate hospitals (and other such facili-
ties) to furnish needed services for persons unable to pay therefor.
Such regulations may also require that before approval of an appli-
cation for a project is recommended by a State agency to the Sur-
geon General for approval under this part, assurance shall be
received by the State from the applicant that (1) the facility or por-
tion thereof to be constructed or modernized will be made available
to all persons residing in the territorial area of the applicant; and (2)
there will be made available in the facility or portion thereof to be
constructed or modernized a reasonable volume of services to per-
sons unable to pay therefor, but an exception shall be made if such a
requirement is not feasible from a financial viewpoint.
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 291(a), 291c(e).
The Hill-Burton Act has been in existence since 1946. From its incep-
tion, this Act has been the principal means for federal support for construc-
tion, expansion, and modernization of public and private, not-for-profit,
health facilities. It has continually achieved its goal of upgrading the nation's
medical care and facilities. The receipt of Hill-Burton funds labels a hospital
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However, the situation mirrors the intent of Section 504," Ts
and is a reasonable extension of Section 504 upon considera-
tion of all the factors. The Supreme Court held in Bowen v.
American Hospital Association,'74 that Section 504 applies in the
hospital context: "[By virtue of the Rehabilitation Act,] handi-
capped infants are entitled to 'meaningful access' to medical
services provided by hospitals, and.., a hospital rule or state
policy denying or limiting such access would be subject to chal-
lenge under § 504."' 1 5 The Bowen Court's reasoning should
apply to AIDS carriers. Therefore, AIDS carriers should
clearly be considered handicapped and should qualify for pro-
tection under the Act.
The effect of the Rehabilitation Act is that every public and
private hospital receiving Hill-Burton, or other federal funds
must treat patients who are otherwise qualified to be in the pro-
gram, including AIDS-infected persons, without discriminating
against them. The Rehabilitation Act does not bind private
practitioners and private hospitals, because these groups have
few legal restrictions in deciding whether to treat a patient.
Some states, however, prohibit even private practitioners and
hospitals from discriminating against AIDS-infected individu-
als, solely on their AIDS-infected status. 176
A. Application of Section 504 to Routine Testing
If doctors or hospitals bound by the Rehabilitation Act
refuse treatment to a patient solely on the basis of the infec-
tious status of that patient, those doctors are discriminating
solely on the basis of the handicap where the patient is other-
as federally funded, triggering the protections of the Rehabilitation Act, and
the protections of the Hill-Burton Act. Hospitals receiving Hill-Burton fund-
ing are bound by the Hill-Burton requirements to make their facility "avail-
able to all persons residing in territorial area of applicant." Those hospitals
which do not receive the funding are not bound by the Hill-Burton Act's
requirements. These self-sufficient hospitals are bound by applicable state
statutes, if any exist, and by their own ethical codes.
While the Hill-Burton Act proscribes the denial of care and frowns on
referral, it does not prohibit the imposition of pretreatment screening condi-
tions. Thus, conditioning treatment on an AIDS test is arguably authorized
by the Hill-Burton Act, at least it is not proscribed, so long as the test is
administered in a non-discriminatory manner.
173. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794.
174. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
175. Id. at 624.
176. See Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS: Legislative
and Regulatory Policy in the United States, 261 J. A.M.A. 1621 (1989).
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wise qualified to participate in the federally-funded program.
This discrimination is clearly prohibited by Section 504.17
Because an AIDS-infected individual, who is otherwise
qualified, is considered handicapped in the public hospital con-
text,' 78 some scholars argue that doctors would be discriminat-
ing against their patients by requiring them to undergo
testing 79 prior to the doctor performing a nonemergency,
invasive procedure. The argument is that if the patient refuses
to be tested and the doctor refuses treatment on that basis, the
doctor is regarding the patient as having a handicap and discrim-
inating by refusing treatment (depriving an otherwise qualified
handicapped individual from the benefits to which he or she is
otherwise entitled in a federally funded program).
If the doctor or hospital has a policy that is narrowly tai-
lored and facially neutral, then hinging treatment on taking the
test should not be a discriminatory practice. An analogy to this
argument is comparing an AIDS test to an entrance exam that
is used to determine whether a prospective employee is other-
wise qualified for a particularjob. If a prospective employee is
denied work in a federally funded program because that person
fails an entrance exam, the employer has not discriminated
against that person, even if that person was handicapped.'8 °
Certainly if the prospective employee refuses to take the
entrance exam, a condition precedent to the employment, a
court would not hesitate to hold the individual otherwise
unqualified (so long as the exam itself was not discriminatory).
An AIDS test, in the hospital context, is analogous to an
entrance exam in that the AIDS test could be a condition prece-
dent to admission to the hospital. If prospective patients
refuse to take the test, they have made the choice, much as
those prospective employees who refuse to undergo an
employment test. While this may not be much of a choice to
one who is adamantly against AIDS tests and who is in need of
medical care, there is always an exception for the emergency
patient. 181 A doctor or hospital should not be considered to be
177. See supra notes 166 to 175 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
179. See Gostin, Curran, and Clark, The Case Against Compulsory
Casefinding in Controlling AIDS - Testing, Screening and Reporting; 12 AM. J.L. &
MED. 7, 37 (1986).
180. See Carter v. United States Postal Service, 23 M.S.P.R. 504 (1984)
(Because appellant failed a qualifying exam, she could not perform the
essential functions of the position in question and has, therefore, not
qualified for her position).
181. See supra notes 121 to 127 and accompanying text.
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discriminating by refusing to treat an individual who refused to
take the test. The important determination then is whether the
test itself, or the manner in which it is administered, is discrimi-
natory and not whether the doctor or hospital is discriminating
by refusing to treat when an individual refuses the test.
When a physician chooses to test that patient, forcing him
or her to undergo such procedure where others not regarded as
having such an impairment would not be tested, the physician
is discriminating against the patient. Doctors should not have
the ability to be arbitrary in their decision of whether to test.
To ensure fairness doctors should not be allowed to choose to
test on an arbitrary basis, and should be required to base their
decision of whether to test upon relevant criteria. The factors
considered could include known sexual orientation, tracks on
arms, or known intravenous drug dependencies.
If the doctors' policies were to test everyone, then no one
could complain about discrimination. Thus, a discrimination
proof regulation would allow doctors a free hand in deciding
whether to require testing of all patients, but to limit that free-
dom at the point where it is discriminatory. Thus, once doctors
choose to test, they should test all. If they choose not to test
all, they should test only those in a high risk category - those
with known drug dependencies, or known homosexuals who
are sexually active and promiscuous. Thus administered, the
test is not discriminatory under the Rehabilitation Act because
the decision to test is not left to the whims of the physician.
In this manner doctors would fulfill their obligations not to
discriminate by choosing either course. If they choose not to
test, then discrimination is not at issue. If they choose to test,
they are at least doing so in a nondiscriminatory manner and
are justified in their choice by way of the regulation.
CONCLUSION
AIDS is a deadly and currently incurable disease which has
the potential of affecting all of us. This student article has dealt
with but one facet of a multitude of issues facing AIDS victims:
routine testing of individuals seeking nonemergency, invasive
health care. Even this narrow topic is riddled with complex
issues. Foremost among these is the need to carefully balance
the rights of those infected with the concerns and fears of those
treating AIDS patients. Upon a study of the tests available
(their accuracy and feasibility, in terms of cost and time
involved), the arguments in favor of and against testing, the
applicability of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
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and the confidentiality concerns, this student article has indi-
cated that health care providers ought to be afforded the
opportunity to test patients, so long as they do so with a narrow
purpose which has neither the intent nor the effect of discrimi-
nating against the individual, and so long as testing does not
lead to a refusal of treatment.

